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Donald Trump’s impact on the Republican Party
Abstract: What impact did Donald Trump have on the Republican Party during his time as
President? This article argues that although the presidency of Donald Trump was a natural
progression of Republican conservatism, his legacy has cast a shadow on the Republican Party,
as well as having further pushed the party rightward, whilst also helping to move the fringe/more
extreme elements of Republican conservatism closer to the centre of American politics. As a
result, the GOP has become increasingly dependent on a base of white support. Continuing along
this path will only further put them at odds with a majority of the country and less likely to
realise electoral victories. Only by a continued abating of democracy through compromises in the
design of representative institutions and electoral practices will they be likely to win or retain
power.
Keywords: Donald Trump, Evolution of Republican Conservatism, Anti-Democratic, AntiEstablishment, Right-Wing, Political Legacy

Introduction
What impact did Donald Trump have on the Republican Party during his time as President?
What will the lasting impact of Donald Trump be? Will the Grand Old Party (GOP) remain in his
shadow, or will Republicans forge a different path without Trump? Whilst turning the page from
Trump may make electoral sense in the long run – given the growing importance of the minority
vote in the United States of America – the base of the party was very loyal to him after the
election, and it is hard to overlook or ignore such a loyal constituency to the former president
(Page and Elbeshbishi 2021; Quinnipiac University Poll 2021).
Trump’s presidential campaign and one term as president may seem like a challenge or
takeover of the Republican Party – which it is to some extent, at least in the short term – but
what he stated and represented as a candidate and president was already present within the GOP.

The conservative evolution and takeover of the party was well underway before Trump’s
nomination, and the movement’s values/beliefs overlapped with what Trump had espoused,
especially the Tea Party Republicans, his political base of support in Congress. The GOP was at
a crossroads after the 2020 defeat and needed to decide if conservatism will uphold democracy
or move it back towards a republic that is increasingly anti-democratic.1
This article argues that Donald Trump has helped to push the GOP further rightward, so that it
has become an increasingly angry white party that is hostile towards democracy. It centres on
how Republican conservatism evolved and built a platform for anti-establishment/right-wing
conservatives. This laid a foundation of rage and paranoia for Trump’s dogma, and his lying and
disinformation that manifested into an assault against elections and democracy. This article
contributes to the special issue (James 2021) and literature on the impact of the Trump
presidency by exploring Trump’s impact on the Republican presidency, the GOP and Republican
conservatism.
The evolution of Republican conservatism
It is difficult to point to a single event that launched the evolution of Republican conservatism;
however, it began to gain traction with the conservative response to Franklin Delano Roosevelt
and the New Deal. The New Deal legislation of 1933 (the first New Deal) gave birth to the
modern American welfare state – a much larger and hands on domestic government role over the
American public. The birth of the welfare state marked the New Deal legacy – the New Deal and
further additions to the welfare state, for example the second New Deal and social security as
well as the Great Society and Medicare. The rise of the New Deal and the modern American
welfare state in 1933 has also guided the evolution of GOP conservatism. Important figures in
1
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the evolution of Republican conservatism have included Herbert Hoover, Robert A. Taft,
William F. Buckley, Barry Goldwater, Phyllis Schlafly, Ronald Reagan, Newt Gingrich, and
George W. Bush. The original GOP conservative critique against the New Deal legacy was an
economic argument, but as socio-morals gained importance in the 1960s and 1970s, the
conservative critique of contemporary times became primarily one of culture – combining a
larger government role in socio-morals affairs (for example, abortion and gay marriage), with a
more hands off government approach in economic affairs (for example, tax cuts for corporations
and the wealthy) (Espinoza 2016).
GOP conservatism gradually took over the Republican Party. As conservatives were evolving
and responding to the New Deal legacy, they were also combating liberal and especially
moderate Republicans for control of the GOP (Schneider 2009; Critchlow 2011; Kabaservice
2012; Richardson 2014). The most recent incarnation of GOP conservatism has been the Tea
Party, which has helped pave the path for Trump’s one term as president.
The Tea Party platform
In many ways, Trump owes his time in the GOP spotlight to the Tea Party. His hyper-partisan
rhetoric, lack of care for the nuance of governing, his focus on policy proposals that appeased his
base but, more often than not, lacked substantive policy goals other than to achieve the
conservative agenda in any given situation, was straight out of the Tea Party’s reactionary
playbook (Gervais and Morris 2018).
Although Bryan Gervais and Irwin Morris focused only on the House of Representatives,
what their research revealed was illuminating. When analyzing House Republicans in the 112th
and 113th Congresses, they noted the overall popularity of the Tea Party, how the Tea Party was
more conservative “on racial and social issues”, and even how the Tea Party was surprisingly

“skilled at legislating” and “enjoyed some institutional cachet” than previously assumed (245247). Moreover, Gervais and Morris went on to address how:
It was the choice of Eric Cantor, Paul Ryan, and Kevin McCarthy, aspiring to leadership
positions in a Republican-controlled Congress, to encourage and recruit Tea Party-esque
members in the lead up to the 2010 midterm elections…. And it was a choice not to more
directly and forcefully confront a rising populist, ethno-nationalist tide that would overtake
the party (248).
And it was that tide that Donald Trump rode in on, one that the current GOP House leader, Kevin
McCarthy (R-CA) was also trying to navigate after the 2020 defeat. There were also Tea Party
Republicans in the Senate who adhered to a confrontational style that caused issues for the
Senate Republican leadership (Theriault 2013).
Whilst inflammatory partisan rhetoric can be good for energising the base and campaigning
against, for example, the Affordable Care Act, it does not lead to an effective governing strategy.
This effectively sums up the Trump presidency, strong on rhetorical flair, but lacking in
substantial legislative achievements other than tax cuts for the wealthy. Overall, the Republican
Party used asymmetrically polarising rhetoric, which bound the party together, but also made it
less flexible when governing in comparison to the Democratic Party (Mann and Ornstein 2012;
Grossman and Hopkins 2015).
Whilst the Tea Party formed Trump’s congressional base, it also held preceding positions
similar to Trump’s, such as: the repealing of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), cracking down on
illegal immigration and securing the border with Mexico (including a border wall), supporting
socio-moral values (abortion and gay marriage), hostility towards Muslims and Islam, concerns
of the undeserving getting undeserved benefits, questioning the legitimacy of an Obama
presidency (with Trump as a ringleader), and polarising rhetoric (Skocpol and Williamson 2012);
as well as the view that racial minorities are changing and threating to damage the country and

set it on the course towards a socialist America (Parker and Barreto, chapter four, 4). The
similarities between the Tea Party and Trump can make it seem as if the Tea Party simply
“mutated” into Trump (Kabaservice 2020).
Mutation was a valid assertion, given that the Tea Party and Trump shared views that adhered
to the paranoid style in American politics as written by Richard Hofstadter (Skocpol and
Williamson 2012, 78; Parker and Barreto 2013, introduction, 2-3; Horwitz 2013, 157-201).
Moreover, this paranoia has driven the evolution of Republican conservatism since the New Deal
era (Espinoza 2016, 234-236).
The right-wing: paranoia and anti-establishment
In his writings on the American right-wing (1965), Richard Hofstadter was drawn to the links
between paranoia and conspiracy (Wilentz 2020, 496). However, whilst Hofstadter focused on
the John Birch Society, McCarthyism, and especially Barry Goldwater – it could also be written
for the Tea Party and Donald Trump. Hofstadter viewed the belief of persecution as central to the
paranoid style,
and it is indeed systemized in grandiose theories of conspiracy. But there is a vital
difference between the paranoid spokesman in politics and the clinical paranoiac . . . the
clinical paranoid sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he feels himself to be
living as directed specifically against him; whereas the spokesman of the paranoid style
finds it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself but
millions of others (503-504).
However, Trump’s paranoid style was a combination of both, against himself and the United
States of America. Alisa Kessel agreed and labelled the difference as Trump’s own “Trumpian
Style” (Kessel 2020, 50-52). Regarding paranoia, Trump was obsessed with the claim that he
won the legal popular vote for the presidential election 2016 (Wootson 2016), and later claimed
that any attempt to challenge his credibility and refute his assertion(s) would undermine him.
Examples included, an investigation concerning possible collusion between the Trump campaign

and Russia (Chinoy, Mah, and Thompson 2018), as well as two impeachment trials as personal
“witch hunts” (Scott and Burton 2019; Gearan 2021). If Trump was not adhering to the paranoid
style, then he was at least following the narcissist style.2 Furthermore, Trump believed that he
won the 2020 presidential election and encouraged a mob to storm the capital to take back the
election steal that robbed him of his victory, and robbed the country of its rightful president
(Rucker et al. 2020; Gearan 2021). This was beyond paranoia, and this fringe/right-wing/antiestablishment has the potential to become the norm for the GOP.
To the delight of the right-wing and the Republican Party, conservatism has evolved and
successfully taken control of the GOP. It is worth noting how what was considered right-wing in
the 1950’s with McCarthyism and the John Birch Society, as well with Barry Goldwater’s
presidential candidacy in 1964 would now be considered the political centre (or the mainstream)
of the Republican Party as it is has lurched rightward (Plotke 2002 [second printing 2008],
xxviii–xxxiii).3
At the core of pseudo-conservatism was a challenge to the establishment, and Trump built his
campaign on being an anti-establishment conservative – which was more due to convenience
than ideological conviction. He challenged the party establishment as he won the GOP primary
contest and then the general election in 2016.4
As Republican conservatism has evolved, it is always the right-wing/anti-establishment that
challenges the mainstream/establishment – whether it is moderates or mainstream conservatism
(by comparison). Although Trump has challenged the Republican establishment, he was
2

For a working definition, I will refer to the Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/narcissistic-personality-disorder/symptoms-causes/syc-20366662 (Narcissistic personality disorder
2017).
3
Table one provides a good visual of the gradual right-ward shift over a forty-year period (1960s-1990s), xxxii.
4
However, Trump’s anti-establishment and anti-elite approach did put him at odds with the GOP at the elite level.
For more see, Saldin and Telles (2020), Never Trump.

following in the footsteps of past anti-establishment figures, such as Barry Goldwater and Newt
Gingrich, as well as groups like the Tea Party.
From a political sociological perspective, Robert Horwitz posits how the anti-establishment
right-wing is now the driving force behind Republican conservatism and the GOP. The Tea Party
took over the mantel of Hofstadter’s paranoid style and made it the driving force behind its rise,
and as Horwitz noted, the Tea Party tapped into the “constant undercurrent of conspiracy and
paranoia in American political culture”, which was evident in the Tea Party’s concern over the
legitimacy of Barack Obama’s presidency (167). Trump also encouraged the Tea Party paranoia,
for example in his dogged pursuit to discredit Obama’s birth certificate, and then fine-tuned the
message to suit his needs.
However, although Trump followed the footsteps of the conservative right-wing, he also
forged new ground regarding ideological flexibility, whilst pursuing a strategy that benefitted
himself primarily and the party secondarily. To D. J. Mulloy, the foundations of Trump’s
strategy were well laid within the “radical elements” of the GOP and the conservative media for
over four decades, and relied on “intransigence, belligerence, dog-whistle politics, demonization
of ‘the Other,’ and a generalized assault on Washington and the very utility of government
itself…” (182). Furthermore, Mulloy made a valid point when articulating that Trump was
adhering to conventional radical right doctrine in two ways. Firstly, in supporting the mantra of
“lower taxes, smaller government, less regulations, less bureaucracy, and fewer regulations”
(183); and secondly, in the
“manner of his politics and his style: in his proclivity for the conspiratorial and appeal to the
populist; in his extreme rhetoric and reliance on the strategy of ‘Multiple Untruth’ (à la Senator
McCarthy); in his tendency toward the demagogic and his subtle—and not so subtle—racism; in
his apparent contempt for the normal rules of democratic politics; and in his desire to turn back
the clock in order to ‘Make America Great Again’” (184).

The right-wing actions and rhetoric that Trump embodied imitated those of the Tea Party. These
actions and rhetoric are increasingly embracing anti-democratic ideals to frame the narrative, no
matter the consequences – even at the expense of the truth and democracy.

The conservative echo chamber: lying, disinformation and anti-democratic ideals
Trump’s lies, supposedly “alternative facts”, were trumpeted via the conservative media as part
of its echo chamber – especially via AM/FM talk radio, Regnery Publishing and Fox News
(Jamieson and Capella 2010; Hemmer 2016; Stelter 2020). A strong conservative platform to
broadcast the message was a benefit for the GOP and for Trump. However, whilst it parroted a
narrative that conveniently benefited Trump, there was also a major downside to the conservative
media, especially Fox News, seemingly working on behalf of the Trump administration (Stelter
2020). The conservative media was reluctant to challenge the Trump narrative on a consistent
basis, and as a result became more of a bullhorn, spreading falsehoods to its followers (Benkler,
Faris, and Roberts 2018, 147-187, 322-339). This was important to note because whereas
Democrats tended to get information from a more variety of outlets, Republican voters
increasingly relied on a few “trusted” outlets, and the first and most trusted source was Fox
News (Jurkowitz et al. 2020).
This is not to suggest that politicians never lie, but the level at which Trump lied has
undermined American democracy.5 One of the few congressional Republicans willing to
challenge Trump’s disregard of the truth as dangerous, Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY) warned that
“Remaining silent, and ignoring the lie, emboldens the liar” (Cheney 2021). Moreover, Trump
5
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employed lies as a way of displaying power and ensuring loyalty within the GOP and amongst
any subordinates (Pfiffner 2020). In the view of James Pfiffner,
Trump’s refusal to admit the truth of widely accepted facts corrodes political discourse and
is consistent with the practice of many authoritarian leaders. The assertion of the power to
define reality by ignoring inconvenient facts is destructive of democratic governance.
Donald Trump’s false statements about politics and policy strike at the very heart of
democracy. If there are no agreed upon facts, then it becomes impossible for people to
make judgments about their government or hold it accountable (35).
Trump’s reluctance to admit he was wrong and double down on his lies are part of a strategy,
one that relied on persona and allowing for lies (or post-truths) to challenge an opposing
narrative (usually the liberal media).6 In this reality, Trump was the saviour who had created a
spectacle where he was the main attraction and where he had all the answers that could “Make
America Great Again” (Reyes 2020). A good example of the power of Trump’s deceitfulness
was noted by Susan Glasser about Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign:
When we assigned a team of reporters at Politico during the primary season to listen to
every single word of Trump’s speeches, we found that he offered a lie, half-truth, or
outright exaggeration approximately once every five minutes—for an entire week. And it
didn’t hinder him in the least from winning the Republican presidential nomination. Not
only that, when we repeated the exercise this fall, in the midst of the general election
campaign, Trump had progressed to fibs of various magnitudes just about once every three
minutes!... So not only did Trump think he was entitled to his own facts, so did his
supporters. It didn’t stop them at all from voting for him (Glasser 2016).
Moreover, when the conservative media did not sufficiently challenge Trump’s lies it was, by
default, defending the lies as being true. Whilst it is possible to help challenge fake news with
factual corrections, Republicans did not attempt to challenge Trump’s lies to an equal amount
when compared to other members within the GOP (Porter and Wood 2019). Trump’s lies also
helped to frame a rhetorical narrative where he presented himself as a populist fighting on behalf
of the American public (Reyes 2020).
6

For more on Trump and post-truth politics, see Hodson (2021), this issue.

If Trump is a populist, then it is worth considering that elements of his populism are based on
how he addresses cultural identity, chaos (alternative facts), and nationalism (Grossberg 2018,
114-142). From a cultural studies perspective, Lawrence Grossberg is of the notion that
“Trump’s politics are cultural: the problem space is reconstructed so that matters of both
economics (reduced largely to the lived immediacy of jobs and taxes) and democracy (the
relations between majorities and minorities) are displaced into the relations of nationality
difference, and political polarization is translated into cultural polarization” (115).
Furthermore, Trump’s cultural conservatism played a vital role in his gaining support amongst
Republican voters for his presidential election victory in 2016 (Bartels 2018); and within the
cultural argument, one should also consider how race and ethnicity influenced whether a vote
was cast for Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017, 39-40).
If we move forward with the premise that Trump’s populism was wrapped up in culture and
nationalism and rails against a multicultural and liberal America, then Trump followed along a
nationalist populist tone set against liberal democracy (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). National
populism follows a trend, according to Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, that is “a set of
four deep-rooted societal changes which are cause for growing concern in the West” (xxi); and
the four changes are centred on the “Four D’s” of distrust, destruction, deprivation and dealignment (xxi-xxiii). Moreover, the “Four D’s” sum up Trump’s two presidential campaigns and
one term as president – he thrived on challenging the system and status quo, relying on the
vulnerabilities of his opposition to convey strength and conviction. A strength and conviction
that can, based on what has been discussed above in this section, described by Michael Kazin as
a version of populism “in the racialist-nationalist tradition” in a similar fashion as George
Wallace and the Ku Klux Klan (Kazin 2017, xiv-xv).
How Trump capitalised on race and rage

Race has both unified and divided the parties, and Trump benefited from this in his 2016 election
victory. However, it can be argued that the unifying justification of white voters voting for
Trump was economic insecurities, rather than racial resentment (Abramowitz 2018). On the
other hand, the wide disparities in racial voting, especially white and black, is due to social
sorting that began with how the parties responded to Civil Rights – when African Americans
became more loyal to the Democratic Party, whilst white voters did the opposite and became
more loyal to the Republican Party (Mason 2018, 32-38).
Moreover, according to Lilliana Mason, “Trump’s [2016] campaign did not tear the
Republican Party apart; he spoke directly to the social groups that have aligned with the
Republican Party in recent years, and he did so with little real policy content” and instead relied
on rage (Mason 2018, 80). In other words, if racial views did not initially drive a voter to support
Trump, their economic insecurities pushed or drove them to a similar conclusion – that they were
losing their country (America) and wanted someone to stand up for them. What Trump was able
to achieve by his implantation and implementation of uncivility was to drive a wedge and thus
separate the “American electorate … into identity-based groups” (Mason 2018, 127). That belief
which can also be phrased as “negative partisanship” has fuelled the racial divide between the
parties (Abramowitz 2018, 5-9). Furthermore, Alan Abramowitz rightly posited that “the
growing racial divide set the stage for the rise of Donald Trump, who appealed to white racial
resentment more openly than any major-party nominee in the post-war era” (9). That appeal was
also evident during the capital insurrection on 6 January 2021 (Pape 2021).
Trump’s rhetoric appealed to many white Americans, especially where race and resentment or
fear was linked to America’s decline. However, whilst Trump’s presidential election victory in
2016 can in part be linked to the nationalized voting behaviour of non-college educated white

voters that helped propel him into the White House (Hopkins 2018, 53-55), the other part of
white Trump supporters’ more nationalized voting behaviour ties into the perception of losing
white privilege and the opportunities that go along with it. Trump was able to unite white voters,
according to Sophie Bjork-James, due to how he “successfully merged fear of economic and
racial change”, and brought together two white blocs of support, evangelicals and white
nationalists behind his “nationalist credo” of Americanism, as part of American First and Make
America Great Again (Bjork-James 2020, 43).7 An alternative and reasonable perspective
considered Trump’s rhetoric and actions as “white protectionism” in the guise of “racial
conservatism” (Smith and King 2021), but especially given what transpired after the 2020
election - the vote fraud myth and new voter integrity laws - white protectionism could also be
viewed as antagonistic (if not overtly oppressive) to the growing minority population.
The loss of privilege was a driving force behind the mantra “Make America Great Again”.
However, his choice of rhetoric also triggered an emotional response that can send people into a
“white rage” that is nonsensical and racist (Ott and Dickinson 2019, 31). Trump’s rhetoric also
triggered a “white rage” amongst Trump supporters on 6 January 2021, with the attempt to stop a
legitimate and democratic certification of the 2020 presidential election results. That particular
trigger could be traced to the belief/fear that whites are being replaced as the dominant
population demographic in America, a theory which white nationalists view as the “Great
Replacement” (Pape 2021). Part of white rage is a concern over the loss of privilege (Dietrich
2014), which is why the appeal to “Make America Great Again” had racist undertones. Race was
also an important factor in Alt-Right attempts to be the latest to influence Republican
conservatism – and Donald Trump.
7
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Trump and the Alt-Right
The Alt-Right helped Trump link his “Make America Great Again” slogan with a populist
rhetoric that both embodied nationalistic undertones and appealed to white Americans (Mulloy
2018, 173-177, 184-185; McVeigh and Estep 2019). Much like Trump, the Alt-Right wanted to
take over Republican conservatism – and the GOP – for its own benefit.
George Hawley posited that “[w]hereas earlier right-wing critics wanted a seat at the
conservative table, the Alt-Right wants to displace conservatism entirely and bring a new brand
of right-wing politics into the mainstream” (Hawley 2017, 7). One major problem that hindered
the desire of the Alt-Right to take over Republican conservatism is that it was mostly on online
movement, although Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign victory helped inspire it to create on
offline existence; and the most memorable (as well as horrific) was the August 2017 “Unite the
Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. The Alt-Right’s online-based presence, according to Cas
Mudde (2019), “sets the ‘alt-right’ apart from other ‘far-right’ subcultures” (60-61).
The Alt-Right’s second major problem was that it tried to go after two main targets, the
conservative mainstream/establishment and an increasingly multicultural America as well as the
American left (Hawley 2017, 91). It was difficult to challenge and defeat two opponents
simultaneously, which is why the Alt-Right decided to challenge establishment conservatism
first. According to Hawley, “the Alt-Right wants the Republican Party to embrace the hard right
and push transparent white identity politics” (93); and furthermore, “[t]he general Alt-Right
critique of conservatism can be summed up as follows: white people are the predominant
constituents of conservative politics, but conservatives in power rarely promote white interests”
(94). It is unlikely that support for white ethnic or nationalist tendencies will be eradicated in the

near future as America becomes even more diverse (McVeigh and Estep 2019, 201-220; Marcy
2020).
White ethnic nationalism was a link between race, rage and Trump that mirrored the AltRight, for race and racial hostilities were very important to Trump’s campaign and presidency.
However, it must be considered that Trump’s rhetoric also supported “white rage” that the GOP,
and especially the Tea Party, espoused during the Obama presidency. Moreover, “white rage”
has been focused on either preventing, challenging or rolling back African American voting
rights – and the quest for “full and equal citizenship” – since the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment in 1865 (Anderson 2016).
Whilst it may be accurate to state that Trump was not an active member or supporter of the
Alt-Right, his rhetoric mirrored that of right-wing populists (Diamond 1995; Berlet and Lyons
2000; Reyes 2020, 870-872; Wodak, 2021), which presented common cause with the Alt-Right
and helped it move closer to the mainstream of conservative Republicanism (Hawley 2017, 128133; Mudde 2019, 164-165), picking up where the Tea Party left off (Skocpol and Williamson
2012, 155-188; Parker and Barreto 2013). Trump’s rhetoric and Trump himself has therefore cast
a shadow over the GOP that will influence the party for the foreseeable future. The question is,
when will it disappear? The answer is open-ended and depends on how long Republicans overall
and conservatives in general elect to fit his silhouette. Trump will not relinquish his influence
without a fight – for he is determined to keep the GOP subservient and firmly in his shadow for
as long as possible. And there are enough Republicans who seem determined to pledge
allegiance to Trump first and the GOP second, as well as a lack of congressional leadership to
push back against this development, further encouraging his supporters.
Electoral strategy

Trump’s time as a candidate and president has left a mark on the Republican Party, as well as on
the norms of American democracy. He was also able to benefit from the fringe/more extreme
elements of the American right moving closer to the political centre. The problem is what this
represents, as well as the issues that arise from such a scenario. Republican conservatism has
increasingly benefitted from the un-democratic aspects of American elections (Millhiser 2021).
In presidential elections, the Electoral College has benefited Republicans over Democrats. Even
though Democrats have won five of the last six popular votes, Republicans have won three of the
last six presidential elections since 2000 (Riccardi 2020). In the Senate, although a majority of
the population votes for Democrats, Republicans can win a majority with less votes, due to how
Senate seats are awarded with equal representation for each state, and that vote gap may increase
in the future (McCarthy and Chang 2021). House of Representative districts are decided at the
state level, but the trend is the same, where Democratic House representatives get more overall
votes for each seat, but Republicans can still win a majority due to how districts are
gerrymandered to their advantage (Rackich and Mejía 2020).
The Republicans have therefore benefited as a result of either a lower voter turnout and/or
more voter restrictions. Moreover, Republican conservatism has become more undemocratic,
relying upon gerrymandering, restricting voting and voting rights to gain or maintain political
power (Epperly et al. 2020, 764-765; Patterson 2020, 149-151; Richardson 2020, 196-201).
These parallel how southern (conservative) Democrats once relied upon undemocratic principles
to suppress mostly African American voters in the South.8 The importance of the South to the
contemporary Republican Party has mirrored what southern Democrats relied upon to maintain
white party dominance of political power in the Jim Crow South (Epperly et al. 2020). As a
8
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result, the GOP has embraced southern white voters and how they identify at the expense of the
rest of the country, as part of a “Long Southern Strategy” to gain political power (Maxwell and
Shields 2019). The Republican Party became extremely reliant on the South as a base of support
in the House of Representatives. By 2020, fifty-four percent of the House Republican seats were
from the South. Such a reliance on the South has even surpassed the forty-seven percent the
Democrats relied upon in 1954 (Hershey 2021, 151-152).
The southern strategy that benefited Trump’s 2016 victory, according to Heather Cox
Richardson (2020), allowed the conservative controlled GOP to move beyond “the cloak of
paternalism” and “display the core of their [conservative] ideology” (198-199). When the
ideology was put into practice, such as slashing taxes and attempting to make government
function at the behest of the elite over the demands of the people, it began to function as an
oligarchy instead of a democracy (Richardson 2020, 199-200). Like such oligarchies as Russia,
Trump relied on referring to the past in order to create a false narrative that painted him as both
victim of and saviour to the problem(s). He even embraced chaos in order to use conflict as a
way to deliver greatness, which Timothy Snyder labelled as “the politics of eternity” where he
made a case that Trump followed in footsteps of Vladimir Putin (Snyder 2018, 8-9, 266-276). In
this manner, Trump could have been able to claim that only he could “Make America Great
Again” as well as “Keep America Great” if he had won a second presidential term, even with a
minority of the vote that was based on the rural white, and a majority male, support that formed
Trump’s base.
On the other hand, that approach did pay dividends for him in 2016, when he made headway
and crushed the supposedly Democratic blue wall in the Midwest, especially the upper
Midwestern states of Michigan and Wisconsin (Jack 2020). Also, in 2020, he gained minority

votes, including Hispanic voters in the heavily Democratic Rio Grande Valley area in Texas
(Cardenas 2020). However, in the end, his method also cost him the popular vote by a wide
margin in 2016 (CNN 2016) and even more so in 2020 (CNN 2020). Whilst Trump moved
conservatism along on its current path, he was not able to challenge the current dominant regime
that has guided presidential political leadership since Ronald Reagan’s presidency, he merely
gave it a sharper partisan edge (Skowronek 2020, 195-220).
In order for Trump or any future conservative Republican to challenge the current dominant
regime, a shift from over-dependency on white voters is required. Population demographics
reveal that as the white population decreased, minority population levels increased, and as of
2019, the white population right was at 60.1 percent, with the Hispanic population coming in
second at 18.5 percent, making it harder to keep relying on the same election demographics used
in previous years.9 However, based on his 2020 voting demographics Trump did provide a
window of opportunity for the GOP to move beyond its reliance on older, white, and male
voters. Whilst Trump suffered an overall decrease in white support, his minority support
increased (Wolf, Merrill, and Wolfe 2020). What hurt Trump, especially, was the drop of white
support in tight margin states that he lost to Biden, including Michigan, Arizona, Georgia and
Pennsylvania (states in which Trump challenged the voting outcome) (Frey 2020). The
opportunity for Hispanic GOP support is cultural (anti-abortion and negative views of the
socialist label) and that is part of how Trump gained Hispanic votes in Texas and Florida
(Alvarez 2020; Hernández and Martin 2020). As a result, the socio-cultural appeal of Trump as a
strong man can appeal to Hispanic voters, but any passed voting (integrity) bills, which limit
9
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voting rights (access), may test that hypothesis, since it will be Hispanic voters that may be
driven to vote Democratic in anger as a response in states with large Hispanic populations.
Party loyalty and policy
The loyalty displayed to Trump has resulted in a mixed bag for the GOP, but the rationale behind
embracing it was an attempt to make use of the opportunity to move American government and
its institutions in a conservative direction. The Republican Party, especially in Congress, has
mostly been made up of steadfast Trump supporters of the Tea Party variety and others –
especially the GOP leadership of Mitch McConnell (R-KY) in the Senate and first Rep. Paul
Ryan (R-WI) and now Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) in the House of Representatives – who
have had a working relationship with Trump for the good of the party.10 Whilst the relationship
was rocky at times, it did achieve one major victory that may last a generation – appointments of
conservative justices to an increasingly conservative leaning Supreme Court (Espinoza 2018).
The promise of a conservative dominated Supreme Court was a major reason why Trump
secured the support of evangelicals, who placed a greater importance on what he could deliver
politically over his personal baggage that seemed at odds with traditional moral values (Martí
2019). Evangelicals voted for Trump in 2016 at 81 percent, which was a higher rate of support
than they showed George W. Bush in 2004 (78 percent), John McCain in 2008 (74 percent) and
Mitt Romney in 2012 (78 percent) (Martínez and Smith 2016). Overall, Evangelicals were
supportive of the results that Trump delivered (Lipka and Smith 2020).
The GOP risks making its loyalty to Trump the most important dimension of conservative
Republicanism. A recent example was the removal of Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY) from her
leadership position. Cheney was replaced by Elise Stefanik (R-NY) as the House Republican
10
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Conference Chair on 12 May 2021. The reason for the switch was that Cheney challenged
Trump’s falsehoods and refused to support his “stolen election” mantra (Sotomayor and
Alemany 2021). Stefanik was more resolute in showing of loyalty to Trump, but the irony of the
switch is that Stefanik’s voting record during the Trump presidency was less loyal than Cheney’s
voting record. A tracking of Trump’s policy support positions had Cheney supporting Trump
92.9 percent11 of the time, versus 77.7 percent12 for Stefanik. Yet when it come party unity,
Cheney had become a distraction and the House GOP (and congressional GOP in general)
wanted to focus on beating Biden and congressional Democrats with the hope of winning back
Congress in 2022 (Johnson 2021).
Nevertheless, their support for claims that the election was stolen, and their support for
Trump’s lies that fuelled the insurrection attempt shows loyalty to Trump above all else. The
Republican congressional leadership also supported Trump by not agreeing to investigate the
cause of the January 6th, 2021 attack on the Capitol. Their rationale is that winning control of
Congress is a greater priority than investigating the causes behind the attack. They stated that
focusing on the investigation could be better spent improving their party’s chances during the
2022 midterm elections, but by ignoring the investigation the party is still supporting Trump as a
de facto position (Lowell 2021). Moreover, supporting Trump and the election fraud myth has
become a primary factor in Republicans challenging and running for posts as state election
officials (secretary of state) in states that Trump lost (and disputed) in 2020, such as Arizona,
Georgia, Michigan and Nevada; even challenging sitting Republicans who would not overturn
the election results in favor of Trump as was the case in Georgia and Nevada (Montellaro 2021).
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It is becoming ever apparent that Trump’s rhetoric and distortion of the truth has helped the GOP
to evolve and is on the verge of becoming an un-democratic party that supports pushing America
back towards a republic. For example, Republican voters who relied on the Trump campaign for
election news were more concerned with election integrity and mailed in ballots than Republican
voters who got their campaign news from other sources (Jurkowitz 2021). The Republican Party
at the state level also embraced the election lie as well, creating voting restriction (election
integrity) bills and laws that make it harder to vote, and the Senate filibuster has thus far
prevented a Democratic controlled Congress from enacting a response (Gardner, Rabinowitz,
and Stevens 2021). What has also helped the conservative response to voting restrictions, is that
the public is beginning to take the GOP position on voter IDs (Sirota 2021).
Conclusion
Donald Trump has cast a lasting shadow on the Republican Party. His impact has been very
influential on the party; and has triggered an overreliance on dishonesty as a means of debate
(via paranoia and rage), which increased the socio-cultural appeal of embracing right-wing
tendencies and has caused the party to become more openly hostile towards democracy as a way
to gain/retain political power.
The party has a choice to make. Will the post-Trump era be a time to refocus and move the
GOP and Republican conservatism back towards a more inclusive approach like George W.
Bush tried with compassionate conservatism – one that could appeal to Hispanics to a larger
degree? Or, will the GOP double down and attempt to forge onward with an increasingly hostile
and white minority driven approach that can work for them given the current framework of
America democracy? The former is the more difficult option, but may offer a long-term gain.
The latter is the easier option in the short-term, but would dial up an already enraged country,

making it more of a republic than a democracy. Either choice would fit within the framework of
the American Constitution, which originally established the country as a republic and only
gradually became more democratic over time. The coming years, especially the midterm
elections of 2022 and the presidential election year of 2024, will reveal whether the party cloaks
itself in Trump’s legacy or steps into the light.
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